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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DISCRIMINATION BY
PRIVATE HOSPITALS PARTICIPATING IN HILL-BURTON
PROGRAM HELD TO BE VIOLATION OF FIFTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
T HE application of the fifth and fourteenth amendment prohibi-
tions against discrimination' has been subjected to much misleading
judicial interpretation. 2 This is caused in part by courts' seeking to
decide these issues through the application of general formulas."
The particularistic approach relied upon by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.4
could bring needed direction to judicial decision-making in this
controversial field of law.
Plaintiffs, Negro doctors, dentists and patients, sought admittance
to defendants' private, nonprofit hospitals' and were refused such
solely because of their race.6 The institutions had received sub-
stantial federal funds7 for the construction of additional facilities
under the Hill-Burton Act.8 This act requires participating states to
inventory existing facilities and to determine construction needs and
priorities according to federal standards. Hill-Burton funds may be
used for new or additional facilities at government owned or private
I E.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (fifth amendment); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (fourteenth amendment).
2 See Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L Rxv. 208 passim (1957).
For a general discussion of the fourteenth amendment prohibitions against dis-
crimination, see Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375 (1958); Horowitz, supra; Lewis, The Mean-
ing of State Action, 60 COLUMf. L. REv. 1083 (1960); St. Antoine, Color Blindness But
Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Dis-
crimination, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 993 (1961); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN.
L. REv. 3 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAs L. REV. 347 (1963).
3 Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 2, at 7.
'323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
'The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and the Wesley Long Memorial Hospital
are located in Greensboro, North Carolina.
0 323 F.2d at 962. There is no dispute as to the material facts in this case.
T Id. at 963 n.6. The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital received $1,269,950.00 or
17.2% of the total construction expenses for two projects. The Wesley Long Memorial
Hospital has received most of the $1,948,800.00 appropriated to it or 49.6% of the
total cost of three construction projects.
8 Hospital Survey and Construction Act (Hill-Burton Act), 60 Stat. 1040 (1946),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1958).
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nonprofit hospitals, the allocation being made by a state agency9
subject to the approval of the Surgeon General of the United States.
Although racial nondiscrimination is provided for in the act, an
exception is permitted if separate-but-equal facilities are pro-
vided.10 Defendants, admitting that they discriminated, received
their funds pursuant to this exception."'
Plaintiffs' suit to enjoin defendants from refusing to admit them
was dismissed by the district court 12 on a finding that since defendants
were not instrumentalities of government, they were not subject to
the restrictions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 3 This ap-
proach which searched for a formal connection was rejected by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. They perceived the inquiry to be
whether the government had become so involved in the activities
of these otherwise private hospitals, that these activities were also
activities of the government, without the hospitals becoming either
instrumentalities or agents in a strict sense.'4 Utilizing this ap-
proach, the majority held for the plaintiffs, finding the necessary
degree of governmental involvement as a result of the participation
by defendants in the Hill-Burton program. 0 Moreover, the court
I In North Carolina the designated state agency is the North Carolina Medical
Care Commission.
042 U.S.C. § 291e (f) (1958) provides "That the State plan shall provide for ade-
quate hospital facilities for the people residing in a State, without discrimination on
account of race, creed, or color, and shall provide for adequate hospital facilities for
persons unable to pay therefor. Such regulation may require that before approval of
any application for a hospital or addition to a hospital is recommended by a State
agency, assurance shall be received by the State from the applicant that (1) such
hospital or addition to a hospital will be made available to all persons residing in the
territorial area of the applicant, without discrimination on account of race, creed, or
color, but an exception shall be made in cases where separate hospital facilities are
provided for separate population groups, if the plan makes equitable provision on the
basis of need for facilities and services of like quality for each group. (Emphasis
added.)
The italicized section of the statute was also at issue before the court, and it was
held to be unconstitutional. However, this note does not undertake to deal with that
aspect of the case. 523 F.2d at 969.
1323 F.2d at 965.
22 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1962).
13 Id. at 641.
1, 323 F.2d at 966.
15 Id. at 964-65. The court said that the Hill-Burton program subjected participat-
ing hospitals to an elaborate and intricate pattern of government regulations and found
the most significant to be: (I) The government has a right to recover a proportional
share of its grant if within twenty years after the completion of the project the hospital
is sold or transferred to one not qualified for a grant or not approved by the state
agency. (2) Participating hospitals are required to meet minimum standards for main-
Vol. 1964: 908]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
noted two additional general theories on which it might have rested
its decision. These theories typify the traditional approach which
employs various general formulas to determine whether the ques-
tioned activity is within the ambit of the nondiscrimination require-
ments of the fourteenth amendment. 6
The first of these theories noted by the court is the state function
theory.17 The court examined the purpose of the Hill-Burton pro-
gram and concluded that a state which joins the program under-
takes, as a state function, the responsibility of providing hospital
care for all the people in the state. As authority for this theory the
court cited one decision 8 dealing with first amendment freedoms
in a company owned town and three cases' 9 involving voting in
primary elections conducted by "private" political parties. To
justify the holding in the instant case on this ground, however, re-
tenance and operation. Grants would not be allocated to hospitals within states that
did not enact a statute setting minimum standards. (3) Federal decision is to deter-
mine what is "adequate service" regarding the number of beds and other facilities and
the manner in which a state agency determines priorites. (4) A participating state must
submit a hospital construction plan which meets the nondiscrimination requirements of
of the statute.
10 Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 2, at 7.
27 323 F.2d at 968.
18 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). A member of the Jehovah's Witnesses,
who was distributing religious literature, was convicted under a state trespass statute
for refusing to leave the sidewalk of a company-owned town. The conviction was
reversed on grounds that a state may not permit a corporation to govern citizens so as
to restrict their fundamental liberties guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, said that company property
when used as a town loses its identification as purely private property.
Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962) was
also cited by the majority in Simkins in support of the state function theory. However,
this case held that the university, despite substantial state financial involvement, was
not subject to the fourteenth amendment.
" Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
In Terry v. Adams, the latest and most far reaching of these cases, there was discrim-
ination on racial ground in preprimaries held in Texas by the Jaybird Association,
a privately financed, voluntary organization. A victory at this stage was the equivalent
of election as the winner usually ran unopposed or defeated any opposition in the
Democratic primary and general election. There was no majority opinion and Mr.
Justice Black joined by two others announced the opinion of the Court. He reasoned
that there was a governmental function involved and that however private the form
of the organization that performs this function, it must comply with the constitutional
prohibitions against discrimination. Mr. Justice Clark, joined by three Justices in a
concurring opinion, emphasized the "attributes of government" of the Jaybird As-
sociation and the delegation by the state of its responsibility. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in his concurring opinion stressed the finding of a formal connection between
the Jaybird Association and the state.
[Vol. 1964: 908
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quires stretching the state function formula and results in logical
implications the courts probably would refuse to follow. Thus, hos-
pital care is not historically or functionally related to the state in
the same manner as are local government and the election of public
officials.20 Moreover, an adoption of this theory might bring all the
hospitals in a participating state within the scope of the fourteenth
amendment prohibitions against discrimination regardless of
whether the particular hospital itself participated in the program.21
As a second general theory, the court felt that affirmative sanc-
tioning of discrimination by federal and state governments brings
the discrimination within the confines of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.2 2 The primary authority cited for this theory is a
decision which held unconstitutional a state statutory provision
which required segregation (when separate-but-equal was the pre-
vailing doctrine) but permitted unequal facilities to be provided for
the two races.2 3  In more recent cases also cited for support,24
state compelled segregation was held unconstitutional. However,
these cases are not strong authority for requiring plaintiffs' admission
to defendants hospitals as they held unconstitutional only the statute
involved and did not affect the right of the private parties involved
to discriminate.
Theories25 which resolve these disputes by the application of gen-
20 See Lewis, supra note 2, at 1098-99.
2 1 Mr. Justice Black, in announcing the opinion of the Court in Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953), said that an organization that performs a governmental function,
however private its form, must comply with the constitutional prohibitions against
discrimination. Thus in the instant situation, since all hospitals in a state participating
in the Hill-Burton program would be performing a state function, they all would
be subject to the constitutional prohibitions against discrimination.
2 323 F.2d at 968.
21 McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914). An Oklahoma statute re-
quiring railroads to provide segregated facilities was held constitutional under the then
prevailing doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 168 U.S. 537 (1896). However, a provision
allowing unequal segregated facilities with respect to sleeping, dining and chair cars
was held unconstitutional.
2'Lombard v. Louisiana, 378 U.S. 267 (1963) (mayor and police chief ordered
segregation); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 378 U.S. 244 (1963) (city ordinance re-
quired all restaurants to segregate); Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 293 F.2d 885, 843
(D.C. Cir. 1961) (segregation compelled by state officials in opinion of Bazelon, J.
and Edgarton, J. dissenting).
These cases also can be distinguished from Simkins on the ground that in these
cases segregation was required, whereas in Simkins the government merely permitted
the recipient of its grant to segregate.
-5 Theories other than those discussed in the text have evolved from approaching
this type of constitutional question in terms of "state action." See Screws v. United
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eral formulas tend to give the impression that the law is precise and
settled in this field, when actually this conceptualistic approach has
resulted in "a host of theories which, taken literally or even seri-
ously, cannot be applied generally. '26 The chief fault in these
theories is that they have caused courts to lose sight of the real in-
terests that are competing for constitutional recognition. 7
In contrast to these formal approaches, the Simkins majority pri-
marily relies on the approach used in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority.28 There the Supreme Court recognized that the fashion-
ing of a precise formula was an impossible task and concluded that
only by "sifting facts and weighing circumstances" can the state "in-
volvement in private conduct be attributed its true significance."20
This type of analysis requires that the court balance the interests of
the parties involved. In the instant case the interests of plaintiffs,
the parties being discriminated against, involve "health and life
itself."30 Defendants are asserting a private right to discriminate
which the Supreme Court repeatedly has said does not violate the
fourteenth amendment.3 1 Although not specifically mentioned by
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (individual acting under "color of law'); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of private agreements).
What seems to be a better view is that of Professor Horowitz who says, concerning
the application of the fourteenth amendment to the many problems that arise under
it, "that in all of these problems there is state action, and that the sole issue, which
tends to become obscured in the search for state action, is whether the particular
state action in the particular circumstances . . . is constitutional when tested against
the various federal constitutional restrictions on state action." Horowitz, supra note 2,
at 208-09.
20 Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 2, at 6.
27 Williams, supra note 2, at 390.
-- 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
- Id. at 722. This case involved the lessee of a state owned building in which an
agency of the state ran a parking garage. The lessee operated a restaurant and dis-
criminated on the basis of race. This discrimination was held to violate the fourteenth
amendment. The majority opinion stressed the degree of the government's inter-
dependence with the lessee, and also discussed the state's responsibility and its inaction.
The Burton approach has been welcomed by some and criticized by others. Compare
Van Alstyne 8- Karst, supra note 2, at 57-58, and Williams, supra note 2, at 382-84, with
St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 1005-06, and Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority-A Case Without Precedent, 61 COLum. L. REv. 1458, 1466-67 (1961).
30 323 F.2d at 967.
31 The Supreme Court has often said that it is embedded in our constitutional law
that the fourteenth amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, how-
ever discriminatory or wrongful." E.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 865
U.S. 715, 721 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
Another equity asserted by defendants is that they took the funds without notice
that they would thereby subject themselves to restrictions on their racial policies. How-
ever, the court found powerful countervailing equities in favor of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
[Vol. 1964: 908
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the court, an important consideration which weighs in plaintiffs'
favor is that the party asserting the private right to discriminate is
an institution rather than an individual.32 It is likely that an insti-
tution or a group has a greater vulnerability to the constitutional
prohibitions against discrimination because of a greater relationship
with and power to affect the rights and interests of the public s3
Furthermore, into this sifting and weighing process must go the
number and degree of government contacts. Present in the instant
case, but not relied on by the majority, are a number of minor con-
tacts that defendants have with the state, such as tax exemption and
state licensing34 of the hospitals, which standing alone are not dis-
positive but combine to build a stronger case for plaintiffs.8 5 The
decision primarily rested on the massive use of public funds and
the interdependence between the defendants and the state and fed-
eral plans for the promotion and maintenance of public health.8 6
As it is in the nature of this type of particularistic approach that
have no effective remedy unless the discrimination complained of is enjoined, and this
discrimination handicaps Negro physicians and detrimentally affects the health of
Negro patients. The court analogized the position of defendants to that of the lessee
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra, who outfitted his restaurant
business, and to the collective body of Southern voters who approved school bond
issues before Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). However, in these cases,
as in Simkins, the equities favoring compliance with the fourteenth amendment
prohibitions against discrimination outweighed the competing interests.
11 "If the purpose of the government in giving assistance is considered to coincide
with the purpose for which the recipient is expected to use the assistance, a plain
difference can be seen between individual and institutional beneficiaries. When an
individual satisfies his private needs, be they subsistence, education, or housing, the
public purposes underlying the grant used by him are exhausted. But an institution
has needs that can generally be described only in terms of its institutional purpose.
If this purpose, private in origin, is to serve members of the public at large, presum-
ably this service is the reason for state assistance, and it is pertinent to inquire whether
the state can help accomplish this purpose without altering the private character of
the institution's activity." Lewis, supra note 2, at 1103.
23 Williams, supra note 2, at 375-77.
" One present member of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Douglas, has taken the
position that whenever a state licenses a business that business is prohibited from dis-
criminating on racial grounds by the fourteenth amendment. Garner v. Louisiana,
36 U.S. 157, 184 (1961) (concurring opinion).
35 Both hospitals received their corporate charter from the state. Furthermore, six
of the fifteen directors of the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital are appointed by an
agent or agency of the state. Moreover, the Cone Hospital also participates in the
training of student nurses from Woman's College of the University of North Carolina
and the Agricultural and Technical College of North Carolina, both state-supported
institutions. However, this program is conducted voluntarily by the hospital at a
substantial monetary sacrifice. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 211 F. Supp.
628, 630-34 (M.D.N.C. 1962).
6 323 F.2d at 967.
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the decision be limited to its facts, 31 the majority emphasized that it
was not creating a legal rule that might operate in circumstances
not before the court.35 Thus, the majority said that not every sub-
vention by the government would automatically bring the bene-
ficiary within the ambit of the fourteenth amendment prohibitions
against discrimination.
The main analysis of the majority in Simkins represents a more
straightforward approach 39 to the application of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments and is one which will give judicial recognition
to the values underlying the formulas without becoming bound by
their broad implications. Under this approach, courts will balance
the interests of the parties involved while weighing the number and
degree of government contacts, and will have to justify their decision
on these grounds. Since close cases will continue to arise, this ap-
proach does not represent a final answer to the many problems in
this field. However, it is more desirable to have these cases decided
on their particular merits rather than by an unverbalized approach
which is then fitted into a conceptualistic formula or by the appli-
cation of a formula without regard to the underlying interests.
37 It is a misunderstanding of this aspect of this approach that has caused com-
mentators to criticize Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority as follows: "It was a
model of circumspection if not irresolution." St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 1005-06.
"[T]he Court, by emphasizing all of the facts, appears to have done its best to decide
a case without creating a precedent." Lewis, supra note 29, at 1466.
38 328 F.2d at 967.
" Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 2, at 58.
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